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Abstract. A major challenge for Agreement Technologies is the combination of
existing technologies and reasoning methods. In this paper we focus on the three
core layers of the Agreement Technologies tower, called Norms, Organization
and Argumentation. We present a framework for arguing about agreements based
on norms, roles and dependence, together with a case study from the sharing
economy.
1 Introduction
Agreement technologies refer to computer systems in which autonomous software agents
negotiate with one another, typically on behalf of humans, to come to mutually accept-
able agreements.1 The concept “agreement” bridges individual and collective reason-
ing, i.e. the micro and macro level studied in economics and the social sciences. The
agreement technologies handbook [22] distinguishes five technologies: for semantic
alignment and interoperability, for normative and legal reasoning, for organizations,
for argumentation and negotiation, and for trust and reputation management. They are
developed in distinct research communities, and this plurality of methods is seen as a
strength rather than a weakness. Consequently, a major challenge is how to combine
existing technologies and reasoning methods. This leads to our research problem:
Question. How to combine norms, roles, dependence and argumentation for Agree-
ment Technologies?
Boella and van der Torre [4] sketch an architecture combining reasoning methods
for all five layers using abstraction, Billhardt et al. [3] propose to represent agreements
using dependence, and in earlier work [10] we propose an abstract model for arguing
about agreements using dependence networks. Building on these ideas, we introduce
an abstract model for arguing about agreements with organizational roles and norms.
The reason to start with roles is that this is the missing concept for the organizational
layer of agreement technologies. The reason to start with norms and roles is to develop
the next layer of the agreement technologies tower (see Figure 1). The motivation for
1 See the website of the European Network http://www.agreement-technologies.eu/
for a historical development of agreement technologies.
our work is the development of a theory of agreement technologies, where agreement-
based coordination [3] is based on the management of dependence [21]. The agreement
technologies tower (Semantics, Norms, Organizations, Argumentation and Negotiation,
Trust) clearly distinguishes between making proposals for agreements and the arguing
about these proposals to form agreements. The layers of the stack are often addressed as
independent issues. In this paper, we present a first step towards the “unification” of the
Argumentation, the Organization, and the Norms layers, where dependence networks
are used to represent proposals for norm-based and role based agreements for agent
coalitions, fundamental to define a framework unifying all layers.
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Fig. 1. The agreement technologies tower [22].
In our new model, we represent a possible agreement as a role based social depen-
dence network, that is, a labeled graph on role playing agents. The agents in a depen-
dence are called the depender and performer respectively, and the labels are reasons
(goals, tasks, resources and norms), together with cost and benefit functions for the
performer and the depender respectively. The goals, tasks and resources are associated
with the agents, whereas the norms are associated with the roles the agents play. We
consider also agreements about which norms are in force, and agreements on which
roles the agents play.
We do not study normative reasoning itself, or dependence networks, role assign-
ment, or argumentation—each of which has a huge literature [22]—but we consider
only their interaction. Moreover, we consider neither the lowest layer of semantic align-
ment and interoperability, nor the upper layer of trust and reputation.
The layout of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem of combin-
ing reasoning and how it has been addressed in the literature. Section 3 and section 4
describe the kind of agreements we can reason on and how roles and norms influence
such agreements. We show how our reasoning framework works in a real world scenario
of sharing economy.
2 Methodology
2.1 Combining reasoning
We use logic and reasoning as our methodology, and we are inspired by two authors.
First, Dov Gabbay [18, 19] combines logics using labeled deductive systems and fibring
semantics, and more recently his network perspective combines or integrates logical
methods with, for example, neural network reasoning and Baysian network reasoning.
He promotes formal approaches to practical (individual) reasoning, and more recently
he studies normative reasoning and argumentation as ways to combining individual and
collective reasoning.
Second, Johan van Benthem [29] uses recursive axiomatizations in modal logic as a
general approach to combine logics of individual agents, distinguishing dynamic epis-
temic logics, preference logics, logics of questions, game logics, and more. An appli-
cation of this theory is in understanding natural language, where combining modalities
and conditionals is a central challenge.
We use individual and collective reasoning methods developed in artificial intelli-
gence and multiagent systems. For example, knowledge based systems typically com-
bine various reasoning methods. As another example, IBM’s Watson2 integrates spe-
cialized reasoners for space and time in its system. Our work in AI is in line with
the work in philosophy and logic of Gabbay and van Benthem, and that there can be
fruitful exchange of ideas and methodologies between philosophy, logic and artificial
intelligence.
2.2 Dependence networks
Castelfranchi and colleagues [13, 28, 8] develop a theory of dependence networks, ap-
plicable to most social interactions. The abstract dependence networks we use in this
paper are directed graphs labeled with various kinds of reasons [31]: the fulfillments of
goals and ought-to-be obligations, the execution of tasks and ought-to-do obligations,
and the production of resources. Our model of arguing about dependence [10] follows
Sauro [25] in that every reason can occur only in the dependence relations of a single de-
pender. In contrast to Sauro, we represent only OR-dependence, no AND-dependence,
such that we do not consider jointly performed tasks, agents together fulfilling a goal, or
together providing a resource. In other words, we assume that tasks, goals and resources
can be performed, fulfilled or provided by a single agent.
For the individual agents, our model of arguing about dependence [10] uses a stan-
dard cost-benefit analysis. Each dependence comes with a cost for the performer, and
a benefit for the depender, which are positive real numbers. The payoff for an agent is
the sum of the benefits of each reason where he depends, minus the sum of the costs
of the reasons where he performs. An investigation into uncertainty, utility, and the
dependence among reasons, are left for future research.
2 http://www-03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/
2.3 Case study: the sharing economy
Agreement technologies are developed around a number of case studies, and we believe
that such case studies are indispensable. An example of an extensive case study in
combining reasoning is work of Gabbay and colleagues on formalizing the Talmud [1].
We are developing a case study on the sharing economy.
Example 1 (Sharing economy). In the collaborative or sharing economy, owners of
underused resources connect with others willing to pay to use them. The connection
between owners and users may be made directly, as in peer-to-peer, or indirectly via a
service. Many different kinds of resources may be shared, the most popular by far being
apartments and cars. Furthermore, car sharing has environmental benefits, reduces the
cost of fuel and tolls, and allows commuters who are more than two per car to use
the carpooling lanes on highways during peak traffic hours and thereby, to save time.
These reasons added to the convenience of not owning a car, and to the personal gains
of sharing one’s own for a fee, make car sharing a particularly attractive choice.
Our running example is a peer-to-peer car sharing. On the one hand, two car own-
ers, Betty and Cathy, each driving their own car are looking to give a ride to a single
passenger in order to share costs and save money. On the other hand, two other people,
Arthur and Dana, both need to get a ride: Arthur to visit his mother, and Dana to go to
work. Moreover, Arthur prefers to get a ride with Betty over sharing Cathy’s car, and
Betty does not want to drive with Arthur, but is obliged to do so.
3 Role based agreements
3.1 Role playing agent dependence networks
An abstract dependence network is a labeled graph, represented by a binary relation D
among abstract nodes represented byN , and labeled byE. If (d, p, e) ∈ D for d, p ∈ N
and e ∈ E, then we say that d depends on p for reason e. Following the usual terminol-
ogy in this area, we also say that p has power over d due to reason e. We call node d the
depender, and node p the performer of the dependence. Each dependence comes with a
real valued benefit for the depender, and a real valued cost for the performer.
Definition 1 (Abstract dependence network). A dependence network DN is a tuple
〈N,E,D, c, b〉 where N and E are two disjoint sets, and D ⊆ N ×N ×E is a binary
(dependence) relation over N for each element of E, and c, b : N ×E → IR0 are (cost,
benefit) functions associating non-negative real numbers with each pair of elements of
N and E.
We distinguish three kinds of abstract dependence networks, namely agent depen-
dence networks, role dependence networks, and role playing agent dependence net-
works. N is instantiated with agents, roles or role playing agents respectively, and E
is instantiated with goals, tasks, resources (reasons for agent dependence), or norms
(reasons for role dependence). The role playing agent dependence network is defined in
terms of the other two, together with a relation plays, which are pairs of an agent and a
role, representing the role playing agents.
We make several simplifying assumptions to facilitate the formal framework. Labels
are specific to dependers, in the sense that distinct dependers cannot depend for the
same reason. Agent reasons and role reasons are distinct sets, and every role is played
by at most one agent. We represent only OR-dependence, no AND-dependence, i.e.,
we do not consider jointly performed tasks, agents together fulfilling a goal, or together
providing a resource. In other words, we assume that tasks, goals and resources can be
performed, fulfilled and provided by a single agent. These constraints are not realistic
for some applications, and we are aware that they have to be relaxed in future work.
Definition 2 (Role playing agent dependence network). Agent dependence networks
ADN = 〈A,E1, D1, c1, b1〉 and role dependence networksRDN = 〈R,E2, D2, c2, b2〉
are abstract dependent networks such that (d1, p1, e), (d2, p2, e) ∈ D1 or D2 im-
plies d1 = d2. An agent role assignment plays ⊆ A × R is a set of pairs of agents
and roles, such that (a1, r), (a2, r) ∈ plays implies a1 = a2. If A ∩ R = ∅ and
E1 ∩ E2 = ∅, then the role playing agent dependence network for ADN , RDN and
plays is an abstract dependence network 〈plays,E,D, c, b〉 such that E((a, r)) =
E1(a) ∪ E2(r), D((a1, r1), (a2, r2), e) if and only if D1(a1, a2, e) or D2(r1, r2, e),
c((a, r), e) = c1(a, e) if e ∈ E1, c2(r, e) if e ∈ E2, and b((a, r), x) = b1(a, e) if
e ∈ E1, b2(r, x) if e ∈ E2.
Example 2 illustrates how three possible agreements for sharing a car (Arthur and
Betty, Arthur and Cathy, and Dana and Cathy) are built up from agent dependence, role
dependence, and a role assignment.
Example 2 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 1). Consider the dependence
network visualized in Figure 2.1. By convention, a dependence of d on p for the rea-
son e is visualized by an arrow from d to p labeled with e. For example, if the reasons
represent resources, then the flow of resources is inverse to the direction of the arrows.
To read these figures, it is easier to start from Figure 2.4 on the right hand side, and
see how it is built up using the other three figures. In Figure 2.4, three large ovals are
visualized one above the other, to represent the three proposals for agreements: Arthur
shares Betty’s car, Arthur shares Cathy’s car, or Dana shares Cathy’s car. The pairs of
agents and roles (a, r1) ∈ plays (Definition 2) are the nodes of the role playing agent
dependence network whose label is expressed as a : r1. Figure 2.4 is explained in more
detail in Example 3 and 4.
A dependence in Figure 2.4 can originate from the agents in Figure 2.1, or from
the roles they play in Figure 2.2, and the reasons, costs and benefits visualized in the
figures explain in more detail why a role playing agent depends on another role playing
agent. The set of role playing agents is given by the agent role assignment in Figure
2.3, but a : r1 and c : r3 are visualized twice in Figure 2.4 to make the proposals for
agreements more explicit. Every dependence in Figure 2.4 is derived from either the
agent dependence network in Figure 2.1, or the role dependence network in Figure 2.2.
In Figure 2.1, the four nodes represent the agents a for Arthur, b for Betty, c for
Cathy and d for Dana. Dependence (a, b, e1) may be read as “agent a, Arthur, depends
on agent b, Betty, to visit his mother,” (a, c, e1) as “agent a, Arthur, depends on agent
c, Cathy, to visit his mother,” and (c, a, e2) as “agent c, Cathy, depends on agent a,
Arthur, to save money.” The reason e1 can be a goal of the agent a to visit his mother,
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Fig. 2. Building agreements: Agent dependence (1), Role dependence (2), Role assignment (3)
and the combination (4).
or a task of Betty or Cathy to give a ride for the visit, or the car shared for the visit can
be a resource. The benefit for a to visit his mother by riding with b (3), is greater than
by riding c (2), whereas the cost for b and c is 1. We write costs with a “−” sign and
benefits with a “+”. Furthermore, dependence (d, c, e3) may be read as “agent d, Dana,
depends on agent c, Cathy, to go to work, e3,” (c, d, e2) as “Cathy depends on Dana to
save money, e2,” and (c, a, e2) as “Cathy, depends on Arthur to save money, e2”.
Figure 2.2, visualizes a role network. A norm “carpooling lane can only be used if
you share, i.e., if you are two or more people in the car” creates a dependency. In our
example, the graph contains only the actual norm e4 between roles r2 and r1. Normative
dependence (r2, r1, e4) may be read as “driver 1 depends on passenger 1 to be able to
use the carpooling lane.”
We now consider the agent role assignment visualized in Figure 2.3. Role assign-
ment (a, r1), may be read as “agent a, Arthur, plays the role r1, passenger 1,” (b : r2)
as “agent b, Betty, plays the role r2, driver 1,” (c, r3), may be read as “agent c, Cathy,
plays the role r3, driver 2,” (d : r4) as “agent d, Dana, plays the role r4, passenger 2.”
Figure 2.4 visualizes the combined models. Each one of the three possible situations
is depicted within an oval. Each double-circle node depicts an agent/role, for example
(a : r1) can be read as “agent a, Arthur, plays the role of passenger 1.” We have mul-
tiple instances of drivers and passengers because each role can be played by one agent
only (see Sauro [25] for a further explanation and discussion, they are sometimes called
role instances).
3.2 Proposals and agreements
We associate sets of proposals for agreements with dependence networks. A proposal
for an agreement is a dependence relation, and a proposal function is a function from
abstract dependence networks to sets of proposals. Dependence (d, p, e) proposes a
commitment of the performer p to act in the benefit of the depender d to fulfill a goal,
perform a task, or provide a resource.
Example 3 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 2). The three proposals for
agreements are visualised in Figure 2.4. by the three ovals, and each oval is a depen-
dence networks itself. For each role playing dependence network, the proposal function
gives all these proposals.
For modeling the interaction among the agents, we use a standard definition from
game theory [30]. A proposal P1 dominates a proposal P2 if and only if for all agents
involved in P1, the pay-off in P1 is at least as good as in P2, and for at least one of them
it is strictly better. The restriction to agents of P1 is crucial: there may be agents who
are worse off in P2, but they cannot argue against it. For the costs and benefits of the
agents, we add the costs and benefits for all the roles they play. It may be that an agent
has a negative pay-off for one of its roles, as long as the sum of all payoffs for all the
roles he is playing is positive.
Definition 3 (Undominated proposal). LetDN = 〈play,E,D, c, b〉 be a role playing
dependence network. A proposal P ⊆ D for DN is a dependence relation. A proposal
function p is a function from role playing dependence networks to sets of proposals
p(〈play,R,D, c, b〉) ⊆ 2D. The reasons where agent a has a benefit in proposal P ,
written as benefits(a, P ), are {e ∈ E | p ∈ A, r1, r2 ∈ R, ((a, r1), (p, r2), e) ∈ P}. Anal-
ogously, the reasons where he has a cost in proposal P , written as costs(a, P ), are
{e ∈ E | d ∈ A, r1, r2 ∈ R, ((d, r1), (a, r2), e) ∈ P}. The payoff of a proposal P for
agent a, written as pay-off(a, P ), is Σe∈benefits(a, P )b(a, e) − Σr∈costs(a, P )c(a, e).
We write A(P ) = {a ∈ A : ∃((a, r1), (p, r2), e) ∈ P or ∃((d, r1), (a, r2), e) ∈ P} for
the agents of a proposal P . A proposal P1 dominates proposal P2, written as P1 > P2,
if and only if the following two conditions hold:
∀a ∈ A(P1) : payoff(a, P1) ≥ payoff(a, P2)
∃a ∈ A(P1) : payoff(a, P1) > payoff(a, P2)
3.3 Acceptable proposals
To define acceptable proposals, we introduce the basic concepts of Dung’s abstract
argumentation [15]. Dominance is not strong enough to reject a proposal, as several
proposals can be accepted at the same time. We introduce now an attack relation among
proposals such that a proposal attacks another proposal when accepting the former im-
plies that the latter is not acceptable. Moreover, we say that a proposal attacks itself
if the payoff for at least one of the agents is negative. Dung’s theory offers the choice
among several alternatives to define when an individual argument is acceptable. First
we have to choose a semantics, then we have to choose whether the argument must be
in the union or intersection of the extensions of this semantics. We say that an argument
is acceptable if it is in the union of all admissible sets (which is the same as being in
the union of the complete extensions, or the union of the preferred extensions). An im-
portant notion in argumentation theory is the notion of defence: we say that argument
arg1 defends argument arg2 if arg1 attacks those arguments attacking arg2. As a con-
sequence, if argument arg1 attacks argument arg2 and argument arg2 attacks argument
arg3, then we have that argument arg1 reinstates argument arg3, i.e., it makes argument
arg3 accepted by attacking the attacker of arg3.
Definition 4 (Acceptable proposal). A proposal argumentation framework (AF) is a
pair 〈P, ↪→〉 where P is a set of proposals called arguments and ↪→⊆ P×P is a binary
attack relation over proposals, where P1 ↪→ P2 if and only if P1 dominates P1 ∪P2, or
P1 = P2 and the payoff of at least one of the agents is negative. Let C ⊆ P . A set C is
conflict-free if and only if there exist no Pi, Pj ∈ C such that Pi ↪→ Pj . A set C defends
an argument Pi if and only if for each argument Pj ∈ P if Pj attacks Pi then there
exists Pk ∈ C such that Pk attacks Pj . Let C be a conflict-free set of arguments, and let
D : 2P 7→ 2P be the function such that D(C) = {P |C defends P}. C is admissible if
and only if C ⊆ D(C). A proposal is acceptable, if and only if it is in some admissible
set.
The example illustrates the central concepts of argumentation, reinstatement and
dialogue games.
Example 4 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 3). The three proposals / ovals
in Figure 2.4 may be called ArthurBetty, ArthurCathy, and DanaCathy. We have that
ArthurBetty attacks ArthurCathy, and that ArthurCathy and DanaCathy attack each
other. For example, ArthurBetty and ArthurCathy are conflicting, because Arthur needs
only a single ride. ArthurBetty attacks ArthurCathy but not vice versa because ArthurBetty
dominates ArthurCathy: Arthur prefers to ride with Betty. Moreover, he is the only
agent involved in both proposals, so he has the power to choose which one he will
investigate first.
Both ArthurBetty and DanaCathy are acceptable proposals. As Arthur will propose
an agreement with Betty, Dana and Cathy can form another agreement. Using argument
games, this can be modelled as follows:
– Dana: Hi Cathy, I need to go to work. Can I get a ride with you?
(Proposal for agreement DanaCathy.)
– Cathy: Hi, I am sorry Dana, but I planned to give Arthur a ride today ...
(Proposal for alternative agreement ArthurCathy.)
– Arthur: Hmm...Actually, I really prefer riding with Betty.
(Proposal for alternative agreement ArthurBetty.)
– ArthurBetty is optimal so it is accepted
– ArthurCathy is therefore rejected
– DanaCathy no longer has an alternative, and is therefore accepted due to the rein-
statement principle.
The following proposition provides argumentation foundations for the do-ut-des
principle. A proposal is exchange-based (or transaction-based) if every dependence is
part of a cycle. This represents the fact that cooperation is based on reciprocity, called
also do-ut-des [25]. The do-ut-des property describes a condition of reciprocity: an
agent gives a goal only if this fact enables it to obtain, directly or indirectly, the sat-
isfaction of one of its own goals. If a reason occurs more than once in an abstract
dependence network, it represents an OR-dependence. If it occurs more than once in a
proposal, the proposal is redundant.
Definition 5 (Non-redundant proposals). A cycle is a sequence of dependencies
(s1, t1, d1), . . . , (sn, tn, dn) such that ti = si+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and tn = s1.
A proposal P ⊆ D is exchange-based if and only if there is a set of cycles C such that
P = ∪C. Proposal P ⊆ D is non-redundant if and only if each reason occurs at most
once.
Proposition 1 (Do-ut-des). If a proposal is acceptable, then it is exchange-based and
non-redundant. If a proposal is exchange-based and non-redundant, then there are cost
and benefit functions such that the proposal is acceptable.
Example 5 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 4). All three proposals in Fig-
ure 1.4 are do-ut-des. An example of a proposal that is not do-ut-des is the dependence
relation {(a : r1, c : r3, e1)}: Arthur shares the car of Cathy, but does not give anything
in return.
3.4 Minimal proposals
In this section, we define a suitable notion of minimal proposal. For example, if propos-
als consist of sub-proposals of disconnected components, then the agents can negotiate
the sub-proposals one at a time.
Definition 6 (Minimal proposal). A proposal P is minimal if and only if it cannot be
partitioned into two or more disjoint proposals P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pn, such that P is
acceptable if and only if for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Pi is acceptable.
The following proposition provides argumentation foundations for Sauro [25]’s in-
decomposable do-ut-des property, abbreviated to i-dud. It shows that if a proposal is
minimal, then it cannot be split into two sub-proposals sharing at most one agent.
Proposition 2 (Indecomposable do-ut-des). If proposal P is minimal, then there are
no disjoint nonempty proposals P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪P2 and P1 and P2 share
at most one agent. If P is a proposal such that there are no disjoint nonempty proposals
P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪ P2 and P1 and P2 share at most one agent, then there
are cost and benefit functions such that P is minimal.
Example 6 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 5). All three proposals in Fig-
ure 1.4 are indecomposable do-ut-des. An example of a proposal that is do-ut-des but
not indecomposable do-ut-des is the dependence relation
{(a : r1, b : r2, e1), (b : r2, a : r1, e4), (c : r3, d : r4, e2), (d : r4, c : r3, e3)}
Arthur shares the car of Cathy, and Dana shares the car of Betty.
In this section we have introduced important aspects of dependence reasoning, such
as do-ut-des, as well as important aspects of argumentation, such as reinstatement and
dialogue games. Important aspects of normative reasoning and role based organisational
reasoning are considered in the following section.
4 Agreements on norms and roles
Norms and roles are mechanisms to obtain desired social behaviour, that is, to obtain
desired agreements. We can use agreement technologies to obtain agreements on which
norms are in force in the system, or which roles the agents play. In theory we could even
consider higher level agreements, such as which meta-norms are in force to agree on
which norms are in force. In the full model, we can use the agreement technologies to
agree on the semantics for interoperability, or the trustworthiness of agents. In Figure 2,
such agreements explain the role dependencies in Figure 2.2., and the role assignments
in Figure 2.3.
Due to space limitations, we can only sketch the theory of higher levels agreements.
Creating norms means that the set of acceptable agreements changes. The number of
possible agreements can decrease, for example because sanctions make some agree-
ments unacceptable, or increase, for example when an obligation becomes an incentive
to start cooperating. Likewise, the assignment of roles to agents may increase or de-
crease the number of acceptable agreements.
4.1 Norm agreements
A social objective can be either a dependence relation that must be realized, called
a positive objective and written as O+, or a dependence relation that should not be
realized, called a negative objective and written as O−. For example, the agents are
desired to help each other, not to crash into each other, etc. The social objectives are
system objectives, or system requirements.
Definition 7 (System objective). LetDN = 〈N,E,D, c, b〉 be a dependence network.
The system objective O = 〈O+, O−〉 with O+, O− ⊆ N ×N × E is a pair of depen-
dence relations.
Norms are mechanisms used to obtain the social objective. We distinguish two kinds
of norms. First, sanctions can be put on existing dependencies, such as penalties or
taxes, and thus change only the cost and benefit functions. Second, obligations create
new dependence relations, as the obligation of Betty in the running example. As with
dependence networks and proposals for agreements, to model the norm creation prob-
lem, we start with a graph of all possible norms, and the actual role dependence is a sub
graph.
Definition 8 (Norm design). A norm networkNN is a tuple 〈R,E,D+, c−, c+, b−, b+〉
where R and E are two disjoint sets (of roles and reasons, respectively), and D+ ⊆
A × A × R is a binary relation over roles for each reason such that (d1, p1, r) and
(d2, p2, r) implies d1 = d2, and c−, c+, b−, b+ : A × R → IR0 are upper and lower
bounds for the cost and benefit functions from roles and reasons to nonnegative real
numbers.
A role dependence network 〈R,E,D, c, b〉 is a norm forNN if and only ifD ⊆ D+,
c− ≤ c ≤ c+ and d− ≤ d ≤ d+.
There are various ways to evaluate role networks against the system objective, or to
compare role dependence networks with each other.
Definition 9. A role dependence network is acceptable if there is an acceptable pro-
posal of the role playing agent dependence network containing O+ and not containing
an element of O−.
4.2 Role assignment agreements
To model the role assignment problem, we can give as input a role network — set of
possible role assignments — as a bipartite graph from agents or roles. The role network
represents capabilities: who has the capabilities (diplomas, rank, etc.) to play a certain
role.
Definition 10 (Role network). A role network is a tuple RN = 〈A,R, PLAY 〉 where
A and R are two disjoint sets (of agents and roles, respectively), and PLAY ⊆ A×R
is a binary relation.
A relation play ⊆ A×R is a role assignment for RN if and only if play ⊆ PLAY
and each agent plays at most one role.
Example 7 (Sharing economy, continued from Example 6). Consider the dependence
network visualized in Figure 3. A second role assignment has now been given, namely
the roles of agents a and d have been switched. Therefore, instead of a single role assign-
ment, there are now two. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 remain unchanged. The additional
role assignments are visualized in Figure 3.3 (b), while Figure 3.4 (b) represents the two
remaining proposals, each of which involves agent c in the role r3. Role assignment (a)
is better than role assignment (b), because (a) allows for more sharing.
The role assignment problem is analogous to the norm creation problem. Moreover,
dialogues on norm creation and role assignment are analogous to dialogue in Exam-
ple 4. How the three agreement processes interact is left for further research.
5 Related research
Emerson [17] was the first to introduce the theory of dependence in sociology, and
Castelfranchi [12] popularized it in distributed artificial intelligence, and later in multi-
agent systems, by exploiting the notion of social power.
In coalition formation, Sauro [24, 25] uses dependence networks to ensure that a
coalition is effectively formed only when all its members agree on it, and they cannot
deviate from what was established in the agreement. To this aim, he defines the do-
ut-des property, based on a balance between the advantages and the burdens of the
agents involved in a coalition, and the indecomposable do-ut-des property which takes
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Fig. 3. Building agreement: Agent dependence (1), Role dependence (2), Role assignments (3)
and the combinations (4).
into account also the costs and the risks deriving from the coalition formation process.
These notions are defined as primitives, whereas we derive them from the definition of
minimality. Norm and role agreements are not considered.
Other papers like the following couple coalition formation and the theory of de-
pendence. Sichman [27], for instance, uses dependence networks to allow the agents to
evaluate the susceptibility of other agents to adopt their goals. Grossi and Turrini [20]
show how dependence-theoretic notions like cycles are amenable to a game-theoretic
characterization. Finally, Bonzon et al. [7] and Sauro and Villata [26] use dependence
networks in cooperative boolean games [16] to improve the computation of the pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium and the core, respectively. Our work is orthogonal to this
game theory research, as we consider arguing about (norm and role) agreements. In
particular, we go beyond the use of dependence networks in coalition formation by in-
troducing Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation as reasoning technique to guide the
agents in arguing during the process for reaching agreements.
Several papers propose to use argumentation theory to reason over the formation of
coalitions of agents. Among them, Amgoud [2] uses a preference-based argumentation
framework to represent coalition formation such that the preferred solutions to coali-
tional games are defined as preferred extensions of the corresponding argumentation
framework, and Bulling et al. [9] present a generalization of Dung’s theory, extended
with a preference relation, such that ATL is used for reasoning about the behavior and
abilities of the agents. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [14] define coalitions of arguments
to reason over the acceptability of meta-arguments in the meta-level, and Bonzon et
al. [6] translate argumentation frameworks into cooperative boolean games to compute
preferred extensions using the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we go be-
yond such a combination of argumentation theory and coalition formation techniques by
introducing the theory of dependence which allows us to compute dependence-based,
norm-based, and role-based agreements.
The work proposed by Boella et al. [5] combines argumentation theory, coali-
tion formation, and dependence networks. They introduce a so called stability meta-
argument which attacks one of these two attacks, preferring in this way one coalition
over the other. A first difference is that they rely on dynamic dependence networks [11]
where also higher-order dependencies are considered, while here we use standard de-
pendence networks. The abstract theory proposed in this paper goes beyond the basic
conflicts among coalitions considered by Boella et al. [5] introducing further constraints
on the acceptability of proposals.
6 Summary and outlook
We introduce a uniform theory for arguing about agreements among role playing agents.
Dependencies among role playing agents either derive from the dependencies among
the agents, or from the dependencies among the roles the agents play. The reasons for
dependences among agents are goals, tasks and resources, and the reasons for depen-
dences among roles are ought-to-be and ought-to-do obligations.
We identify three kinds of agreements in our case study: agreements about car shar-
ing, agreements about the norms in force, and agreements about role assignment. Due
to space limitations, we only detailed the theory about the first kinds of agreements, and
leave the details of the other agreements for future research.
The theory about agreement establishes two kinds of results, one regarding admis-
sibility, and another one regarding minimality. They make argumentation more efficient
by focussing on the relevant alternatives.
Admissibility Acceptable proposals are based on the do-ut-des principle: every agent
gains something from the agreement. Likewise, acceptable role assignments and
acceptable norms must have an effect on behavior, in the sense that acceptable role
assignments and norms must create new cycles.
Minimality Minimal proposals are based on the indecomposable do-ut-des principle:
the proposal cannot be split into sub proposals. Likewise, minimal role assignments
and norms should reach their goal effectively.
There are several insights which make argumentation theory useful in the proposal
phase of reaching agreements. In particular, an important reason for the popularity of
Dung’s abstract theory is that it can be applied to non-monotonic reasoning by instan-
tiating the abstract arguments with logical formulas [23], along the same lines as we
have instantiated them with proposals for agreements. Moreover, Dung shows how his
theory can be applied also to reasoning about games. Likewise, we can instantiate the
abstract reasons with logical formulas representing goals, abilities, tasks and resources.
Besides formalising the norm creation and role assignment agreements, in future
research we will also extend our model to the other two layers of the agreement tech-
nologies tower.
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